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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
西藏自治区人民政府


西藏自治区公路路产路权保护办法

西藏自治区人民政府令第8号


　　现发布《西藏自治区公路路产路权保护办法》，自发布之日起施行。
　　

自治区主席 江村罗布
一九九四年十一月三日


　　西藏自治区公路路产路权保护办法
　　

第一章 总 则


　　第一条 为加强我区公路路政管理，保护路产，维护路权，保证公路畅通和公路运输安全，使公路更好地为我区国民经济发展和巩固国防服务，根据《中华人民共和国公路管理条例》及其《实施细则》，结合我区实际情况，制定本办法。
　　第二条 凡在我区境内的国家干线公路（以下简称国道），自治区干线公路（以下简称省道），县公路（以下简称县道），乡公路（以下简称乡道），均适用本办法。
　　专用公路及其它公路可参照本办法执行。
　　第三条 公路、公路用地和公路设施均属国家所有，受国家法律保护，任何单位和个人都不得侵占和破坏。
　　公民有遵守公路管理法规、保护公路路产的义务，有检举、揭发和控告一切违章利用、侵占、破坏路产及其他违反《条例》和本办法行为的权利。
　　第四条 各级人民政府应加强对公路路政管理工作的领导，认真解决路政管理中存在的问题。
　　公安、土地、城建、工商、水利、电力、邮电、农业、林业、
　　环保、环卫、学校等有关部门和单位应积极协助、支持做好公路路政管理工作。
　　第五条 公路主管部门负责管理和保护公路、公路用地及公路设施，有权依法检查1制止、处理各种侵占、破坏公路、公路用地及公路设施的行为。
　　

第二章 公路路产路权保护与管理


　　第六条 为保护公路路基，公路两侧排水沟（边沟）以外或路堤护坡道坡脚、路堑坡顶1截水天沟以外1－3米为公路用地范围，具体范围由当地县级人民政府确定。
　　第七条 按照自治区有关规定，经所在地县级土地管理部门审查后报县级人民政府批准划定的公路料场和用地，由公路主管部门管理和使用，任何单位和个人都不得侵占，不得借故阻挠或索取价款。
　　第八条 严禁在公路桥梁、导流坝、公路渡口上下游各二百米范匡内取土、采石、取砂、改变河床状况，进行爆破作业，倾倒垃圾废料。
　　在大中型桥梁两岸引道一百米范围内，不得设立有碍视线和行车安全的建筑物。
　　第九条 未经公路养护单位同意，不得利用公路截水天沟进行灌溉，不得利用公路桥梁、涵洞架设闸门、渡槽、管道，不得在公路上摊晒粮草、打场、堆放物料、挖沟筑埂；禁止在公路上设置电杆、变压器、管线及其它设施。
　　第十条 严禁窃取、移位、涂改、毁坏公路安全标志牌、指示牌、里程碑、百米桩、护栏、桥梁栏杆等公路设施。
　　第十一条 各级公路主管部门应加强公路养护工作，保持公路完好、平整、畅通，提高公路的通过能力和抗灾能力。
　　公路主管部门凡改建、维修公路，应采取措施保证车辆通行。如需中断交通，应事先发布通告。
　　公路发生严重自然灾害致使交通受阻时，当地人民政府应当立即动员和组织附近驻军和人民群众协助抢修通车。任何人不得借公路受灾之机设置路障、阻碍抢修，擅自向过往车辆索款。
　　第十二条 在公路两侧从事开山、伐木等施工作业，不得损坏公路，危及行车安全。
　　第十三条 禁止未挂胶皮的履带车和铁轮机动车辆在沥青路面、水泥混凝土路面的公路上行驶。特殊情况确需行驶时，须经公路主管部门批准，并采取保护路面措施。禁止超越公路桥涵、渡口承载能力的车辆以及超过限高、限宽、限长标准的车辆通行。特殊情况必须通过的应提前报经公路主管部门审核同意，采取有效的安全保护措施后方可通行，所需费用和材料由行车单位负担。
　　第十四条 凡修建机场、电站、水库、水渠、厂矿和埋设管道、电线等永久性工程，需占用或改建公路及附属设施的，建设单位必须提前三个月征得公路主管部门同意，并签定协议后，方可进行，并负责按公路原有技术标准、质量要求进行修复或改建，也可以拨款委托公路主管部门修复或改建。
　　第十五条 各级公路主管部门应严格审批跨越公路的建筑设施及控制公路两侧的＇建筑红线，保障公路完好、畅通。 、
　　新建或改建跨越公路的渡槽和管线等设施，建设单位应提前三个月征得公路主管部门的同意，办理手续后方准施工，其净空高度不得少于五米，跨度不得少于公路规划的路基宽度。需在公路下面埋设的，深度不得少于一米。因施工造成路产损坏的，建设单位应负责修复或赔偿。
　　公路两侧修建永久性工程设施，其建筑物边缘与公路边沟外缘的间距为：
　　国道不少于二十米；
　　省道不少于十五米；
　　县乡道不少于五米。
　　在公路弯道内侧和平交道口附近新建、改建建筑物，种植作物和植树造林，不得影响行车视线。
　　第十六条公路主管部门收到挖掘、跨（穿）越公路、公路用地和公路设施的申请后，应在二十日内作出书面答复。
　　第十七条公路主管部门可以设立路政管理机构，配备相应的路政管理人员，具体实施公路路政管理和业务工作，行使有关职权。
　　路政管理人员执行公务，一律按国家规定统一着装，佩
　　戴（中国公路路政）胸徽，并持有公路主管部门发放的“中华
　　人民共和国公路路政管理证”及指挥旗（灯）。路政巡查车辆
　　须装有“管路政管理”标牌和标志灯饰。
　　第十八条，公路绿化工作由各级公路主管部门统筹规划，不论树权属谁所有，需要采伐、更新时，国道、省道必须经自治区公路主管部门和自治区林业管理部门批准，并发给采伐证后方可采伐。
　　

第三章 奖 惩


　　第十九条 对违反本办法规定的单位和个人，公路主管部门有权给予处罚。
　　第二十条 对违反本办法第六条、第七条规定，任意掘洞，挖土，采石等有碍公路正常养护和破坏公路路基行为的，处以40元以内罚款。对造成路产损失的责令限期修复或缴纳、并处以公路损失赔（补）偿费20％至50％的罚款。
　　第二十一条 对违反本办法第八条、第九条、第十条规定的，要限期拆除，恢复原状，没收非法所得，并处以40元以内罚款。对造成路产损失的责令限期修复或缴纳养护费，并处以公路损失赔（补）偿费20％至50％的罚款。
　　第三十二条 对违反本办法第十三条规定，造成路产损失的，责令限期缴纳路产损失费，并处以不超过损失费20％的罚款。对未造成路产损失的，处以100—500元罚款。
　　第二十三条 对违反本办法第十四条、第十五条规定，未征得公路主管部门同意而擅自动工的，责令立即停工，限期补办有关手续，对已造成路产损失的赔偿公路损失，并可根据情节轻重处以不超过公路损失赔（补）偿费20％的罚款。
　　第二十四条 对违反本办法第十八条规定的，按林业管理部门的有关规定处理。
　　第二十五条 因交通事故而毁坏路产的，应责成责任方对毁坏的路产进行修复或折价赔偿。对于过境车辆造成路产损失而拒不赔（补）偿的，公路路政管理人员有权扣证，通知有关部门处理。
　　第二十六条 公路损失赔（补）偿费，用于公路维修，所处罚款及实物变价款一律按规定上交财政，不得任意截留或挪用。
　　第二十七条 实施公路路政管理、保护路产路权，坚持以教育为主，处罚为辅的原则。各级路政管理人员违反本办法、滥用职权、越权行政或徇私舞弊的，由公路主管部门或其授权的单位给予行政处分或经济处罚。
　　公路路政管理人员受本单位或上级单位负责人指使、纵容而违反本办法规定的，除追究其本人责任外，并应追究有关单位及其负责人的责任。
　　第二十八条 路政管理人员应严格按照法定程序处理路政案件。当事人对公路主管部门给予的行政处罚不服的，可在规定时间内向上级公路主管部门提出申诉，对上级主管部门处理决定仍不服的，可在接到处理决定之日起十五日内向当地人民法院起诉，期满不起诉又不履行的，公路主管部门可以申请人民法院强制执行。
　　第二十九条 对抗拒、阻扰路政管理人员执行公务，危害人身安全，以及违反治安管理的行为，由公安机关依照《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚条例》的有关规定予以处罚。对构成犯罪的移送司法机关追究刑事责任。
　　第三十条 对积极协助、配合公路主管部门保护路产，同违反本办法的行为作斗争的单位和个人，公路主管部门给予精神或物质奖励。
　

　第四章 附 则


　　第三十一条 本办法下列用语的含义是：
　　“公路”是指经公路主管部门验收认定的城间、城乡间、乡间能行驶汽车的公共道路。公路包括公路的路基、路面、桥梁、涵洞、隧道。
　　“公路用地”是指公路两侧边沟（或者截水沟）及边沟（或者截水沟）以外1－3米范围的土地。
　　“公路设施”是指公路的排水设备、防护构造物、交叉道口、界碑、测桩、安全设施、通讯设施、检测及监控设施、养护设施、服务设施、渡口码头、花草林木、专用房屋等。
　　第三十二条 损坏、占用公路、公路用地和公路设施赔（补）偿费用标准，由自治区公路主管部门会同有关部门制定。
　　第三十三条 本办法由自治区公路主管部门负责解释。
　　第三十四条 本办法自发布之日起施行。